Real-time Pricing Based on Game Theory in Smart Community from Advertisement Perspective

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2019.03.010

Abstract

Abstract: Considering the competition behavior of electricity suppliers in continuous time slots, advertising differential game theory is introduced to depict the interaction among electricity suppliers. A Stackelberg game model with multiple leaders and multiple followers is formulated to study the real-time electricity pricing problem. By solving the optimal problem on user side and the non-cooperative differential Nash equilibrium among electricity suppliers, the Stackelberg game equilibrium between the suppliers and users is achieved. Finally, the real-time electricity price under the advertising competition of electricity suppliers is obtained. The results of numerical simulation show that the maximum payment of electricity suppliers taking advertising behavior increases first and then decreases with the increase of its advertising cost and price, but increases with the increase of user scale. In addition, with the increase of unit advertising cost, the uniform electricity price of electricity suppliers gradually decreases and the user's utility is improved. Moreover, the electricity suppliers with lower advertising cost sell more electricity.

Key words: smart grid, demand response management, real-time pricing, differential game, Stackelberg game

CLC Number:

O225
TM73

LI Lu, DAI Yeming. Real-time Pricing Based on Game Theory in Smart Community from Advertisement Perspective[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2019, 22(3): 77-85.

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