Abstract: In order to study the impact of government subsidies, the reciprocal altruism preferences of the manufacturer and the retailer in a green supply chain on two parties’ pricing strategies, profit, product green degree and overall profit of green supply chain, the green supply chain members’ optimal strategies are studied by using game theory and numerical simulation method. The research shows that the unilateral reciprocal altruistic preference of the manufacturer or retailer will reduce its own profit and increase the product green degree, the counterparty’s profit and the overall profit of the supply chain. Moreover, when both sides have the same degree of reciprocal altruistic preference, the retailer’s reciprocal altruistic preference can improve the product green degree more effectively; whether the manufacturer or the retailer has reciprocal altruism preference, the increase in government subsidies will enhance the promotion impact of its reciprocal altruism preference to product green degree, the counterparty’s profit and the overall profit of the supply chain to some extent, but the difference is that when the manufacturer has reciprocal altruism preference, the increase in government subsidies will aggravate the damage of its reciprocal altruistic preference to its own profit to certain extent, and such case will not happen when the retailer has reciprocal altruism preference.

Key words: green supply chain, reciprocal altruistic preference, government subsidies, optimal decision