Abstract: The determination of the product green degree and pricing of the second-level green supply chain is focused on. With the retailer's advantage in sales cost information and the existence of false reporting as the background, the supply chain members' risk aversion characteristics are considered, false reporting coefficients are designed, a centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model are established to get the optimal wholesale price, green degree and retail price in the case of misreporting, and the impact of risk aversion and the degree of misreporting on decision-making is analyzed. The conclusions are verified through a numerical analysis and a parameters sensitivity analysis. The results show that: under centralized decision, the risk aversion of members and the misrepresentation of retailers all lead to a reduction in the wholesale price and greenness of green products. Under decentralized decision, there is an inflection point of the retailer's risk aversion factor and the false reporting behavior has positive and negative effects on the product's optimal wholesale price, greenness, and retail price, respectively;when the false report coefficient is 1.05, the retailer expects profits reach the maximum value; when the false report coefficient changes, the optimal retail price is the most sensitive, followed by the optimal green degree, and finally the optimal wholesale price.

Key words: green supply chain decision, risk aversion, information asymmetry, Stackelberg game