Abstract: In order to study the optimal strategy and maximum profit of the TPL-led fresh produce three-layer e-commerce supply chain with the market demand which is affected by online retail price, availability of safety traceability system and freshness, the Stackelberg game model consisting of a TPL, a supplier, and a fresh produce e-commerce enterprise is constructed to investigate the impact of different leadership on optimal strategy and profit. The strategy differences of supply chain with different leadership are analyzed, and the theoretical derivations and results are illustrated with numerical examples. The results show that: the TPL profit, availability of safety traceability system, fresh-keeping effort and market demand when the supplier is under the second leadership are greater than those when it is under the third leadership. Different leadership of product suppliers will also have an impact on the profits of supply chain enterprises, and the profits tend to be those with higher leadership. However, the total profits of the two modes under decentralized decision-making are lower than those under centralized decision-making.

Key words: game theory, supply chain decision, fresh E-commerce, three-level supply chain, right structure