Abstract: Based on the carbon tax policy, a two-level agricultural supply chain is constructed, in which manufacturers implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and retailers provide product preservation services. Considering the influence of emission reduction efforts, preservation efforts and sales prices on market demand, Stackelberg game theory is used to compare and analyze the optimal decisions of supply chain members and the overall profit of the supply chain under the influence of emission reduction demand and preservation demand elasticity coefficients in centralized and decentralized situations. It is found that the emission reduction efforts of manufacturers, the preservation efforts of retailers and the overall profit of the supply chain in a decentralized situation are all lower than those in a centralized one, also, they are proportional to the elasticity coefficients of emission reduction demand and preservation demand. Furthermore, a contract is designed and find that the "cost sharing" contract can stimulate emission reduction only, but can not achieve supply chain coordination; when the parameters of the "bilateral cost sharing-benefit sharing" contract satisfy certain conditions, it can not only stimulate manufacturers to reduce emissions and retailers to improve their preservation efforts, but also realize Pareto optimality.

Key words: agricultural supply chain, carbon tax, low carbon emission reduction, freshness-keeping efforts, bilateral cost sharing-benefit sharing contract