Abstract: Considering the altruism preference of supply chain members and the dynamic evolution of supply chain, the corresponding decision models under linear demand and nonlinear demand are established. Firstly, the equilibrium strategies of supplier-retailer game are analyzed in the short term. Then, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze independent evolution and interactive evolution of supplier-retailer game in the long term. Finally, the supply chain members' equilibrium strategies are compared under two demand conditions and the influence of retailers' altruism preference on the members' strategies studied. The results show that the supplier's equilibrium strategy relies on the retailer's strategy in the short term, but the retailer's equilibrium strategy is not affected by the supplier's. In the short term, the retailer always chooses altruism strategy. In the long term, the supplier always chooses incentive strategy and the retailer always chooses altruism preference strategy. Furthermore, the retailer's altruism preference can maximize his utility and increase the supplier's profit. It is also found that the retailer's altruism preference can help to promote cooperation among members in supply chain.

Key words: incentive strategy, altruism preference, information asymmetry, evolutionary game, dynamic evolution