Abstract: Under the mechanism of carbon quota and carbon trading, in order to explore the joint dynamic emission reduction problem of the whole supply chain, the time preference utility function is introduced and a three-party differential game model of supplier, manufacturer and retailer is constructed. The trajectory of carbon emission reduction and the overall value of supply chain under non-collaborative decentralized decision-making and collaborative centralized decision-making are obtained by using the reverse induction method. At the same time, a numerical simulation is carried out on the tripartite value of consistent decision time preference and inconsistent decision time preference. The results show that the carbon emission reduction under collaborative centralized decision-making is greater than that under non-collaborative decentralized decision-making, and collaborative centralized decision-making is more conducive to achieving Pareto optimization of carbon emission reduction; in the two kinds of decision-making, the decision-maker with the same time preference often gets higher value; on the contrary, the decision-maker will get less value, and the inconsistent degree of time preference aggravates this phenomenon.

Key words: carbon quota and carbon trading, time preference difference, supply chain emission reduction, dynamic game