Contract and Game Models of Green Supply Chain with Risk-averse Retailer
Jiang Shi-ying1,2, Ma Chun-yan3
2015, 18 (3):
30-35.
Based on a two-stage green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game models and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model are established. Comparing the two game models, interaction of product greenness, wholesale prices, product prices and risk aversion and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also discussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is used to coordinate the green supply chain. Results: In a centralized decision-making model, the retailer's profit per unit and gross profit of products are zero; in the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model, product price will be gradually reduced along with retailers improving the degree of risk aversion; the transfer price in the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model is greater than that in centralized decision-making model; and there are revenue sharing coefficients so that the manufacturer-led green supply chain and the retailer-led green supply chain can be coordinated
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