工业工程 ›› 2020, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (5): 158-168.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.05.021

• 实践与应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑风险态度的绿色供应链定价策略及政府补贴政策分析

朱琳, 窦祥胜   

  1. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院,四川 成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2019-06-28 发布日期:2020-10-30
  • 作者简介:朱琳(1996-),女,江西省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为绿色供应链
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(10XJY004)

A Research on Risk Aversion-based Green Supply Chain Pricing and Government Subsidies

ZHU Lin, DOU Xiangsheng   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
  • Received:2019-06-28 Published:2020-10-30

摘要: 针对同为风险规避者的零售商与制造商组成的二级绿色供应链系统,基于政府对制造商进行生产成本补贴的政策环境,在零售商与制造商共同进行生态努力的假设下,分别就零售商领导下的博弈以及集中控制型决策下的2种不同的渠道结构,讨论了绿色产品的零售价格、批发价格以及绿色度的均衡结果。同时,进一步分析比较了在零售商占据主导地位的Stackelberg模型中,制造商成本补贴、消费价格补贴以及无政府补贴3种不同的政府策略下各因素均衡结果的变化。最后,通过数值仿真深入分析了政府补贴比例和零售商与制造商的风险规避程度的变动对各均衡结果的影响。结果表明,在零售商主导模式下,制造商的风险规避程度对于各因素均衡影响相对更大。相较于其他策略,政府对绿色消费者实施价格补贴策略能够更好地提高产品绿色质量、降低产品价格、刺激绿色需求、提升社会效用。

关键词: 绿色供应链, 风险规避, 政府补贴, 产品绿色度

Abstract: Aiming at a two-stage green supply chain system consisting of retailers and manufacturers who are both taking risk aversion and based on the government’s policy environment of subsidizing manufacturers’ production costs, and under the assumption that retailers and manufacturers work together on ecological efforts, the equilibrium retail price, equilibrium wholesale price and equilibrium green degree of product in two different game model of retailers leading Stackelberg game model and centralized control game model are explored. In addition, government subsidies for green manufacturers is another assumption of this research. Furthermore, in a retailers leading Stackelberg game model, the equilibrium value of retail price, wholesale price and green degree of product are analyzed and compared under three different government policies: subsidies to green manufacturers, subsidies to green consumers and no subsidy policy. Finally, a numerical method is used to investigate the impact of government subsidy ratio, risk-defending degree of manufacturers and retailers to other factors. The results show that in a retailers leading Stackelberg game model, risk-defending degree of manufacturers has more significant influence on other factors. Besides, government subsidies to green consumers has better effect on improving green product quality, reducing price, stimulating green demand and improving social welfare.

Key words: green supply chain, risk aversion, government subsidies, green degree of product

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