工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2021, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (6): 83-92.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.06.011

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑制造商设备维修的制造—零售供应链决策与协调

陈兆波1,2, 李晓卿1,2, 田春英3   

  1. 1. 太原科技大学 装备制造业创新发展研究中心;
    2. 经济与管理学院，山西 太原 030024;
    3. 哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院，黑龙江 哈尔滨 150080
  • 收稿日期:2020-06-11 发布日期:2022-01-24
  • 作者简介:陈兆波(1983—)，男，四川省人，副教授，博士，硕士生导师，主要研究方向为优化理论、供应链管理
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(19GBL259)；山西省高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目(201801032)

The Decision and Coordination of Manufacturing-Retail Supply Chain with Manufacturer Equipment Maintenance

CHEN Zhaobo1,2, LI Xiaoqing1,2, TIAN Chunying3   

  1. 1. Research Center for Innovation and Development of Equipment Manufacturing Industry;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, Taiyuan 030024, China;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Harbin University of Science and Technology, Harbin 150080, China
  • Received:2020-06-11 Published:2022-01-24

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摘要： 设备可靠性是影响供应不确定的重要因素。为了研究企业内部的维修策略对整条供应链的运营策略产生的具体影响，在考虑设备维修的情况下，针对单个制造商和单个零售商构成的二级供应链，运用Stackelberg博弈的方法研究制造商的最优维修策略和定价策略以及零售商的最优订货量。研究结果表明，制造商的预防性维修次数存在上限且最大维修次数与设备可靠性无关；预防性维修策略有助于提高制造商的产量，降低产品的批发价格，但制造商的最优产出量不会达到企业的最大产能；收益共享契约能够实现供应链的协调；制造商在任何情形下都具有提高设备可靠性的动机，但零售商只会在市场规模较大时才存在为制造商提供设备改造资金的动机。

关键词: 供应链, 预防性维修, 设备可靠性, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: Equipment reliability is an significant factor affecting supply uncertainty. In order to study the influence of the maintenance strategy within the enterprise on the operation strategy of the entire supply chain, considering the equipment maintenance, the manufacturer's optimal maintenance strategy and production strategy and the retailer's optimal order quantity are studied for the supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer by Stackelberg game. The results show that the manufacturer's maximum number of preventive maintenance has no relevance to the reliability of the equipment; preventive maintenance can increase the manufacturer's output and reduce the wholesale price of the product, but the optimal output of the manufacturer will not reach the enterprise maximum production capacity; revenue-sharing contract can realize the coordination of supply chain; the manufacturer always has incentive to improve the equipment reliability while the retailer has incentive to fund the equipment improvements only when the market base is large enough.

Key words: supply chain, preventive maintenance, equipment reliability, Stackelberg game

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