工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2011, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (4): 63-67.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

依赖于价格的供应链质量惩罚策略研究

  

  1. 南通大学 商学院，江苏 南通 226019
  • 出版日期:2011-08-31 发布日期:2011-09-08
  • 作者简介:陈敬贤（1982-），男，安徽省人，讲师，硕士，主要研究方向为决策分析与供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金青年项目（10CGL025）；江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目（2010SJB630055）；安徽省软科学基金资助重点项目（07030503019）；南通大学人文社会科学资助项目（09W021)

Quality Penalty Strategy in Price-Dependent Supply Chain  

  1. School of Business, Nantong University, Nantong 226019,China
  • Online:2011-08-31 Published:2011-09-08

摘要： 为了有效激励供应商提高产品质量，提出了一种制造商主导下依赖于产品价格的供应链质量惩罚策略。分别考虑由于供应商提供不合格产品而引起的制造商内部质量损失和外部质量损失。制造商依据产品价格对供应商实施质量惩罚，运用主从对策的方法建立了供应商与制造商的Stackelberg博弈模型，求解了模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡解。算例则针对4种常见情况下的惩罚策略，利用数值结果分析比较了所构建的质量惩罚策略的优势。结果表明：依赖于价格的质量惩罚策略有利于激励供应商提高产品质量，增加供应链收益。

关键词: 供应链, 价格依赖的质量惩罚, 主从对策, 纳什均衡

Abstract: The supply chain considered in this paper is composed of a supplier and a manufacturer. The manufacturer can use a price-dependent penalty policy to the supplier if the supplier provides non-qualified products. Thus, in the supply chain the manufacturer acts as leader. In considering internal quality loss (IOL) and external quality loss (EQL) caused by defective raw materials, a Stackelberg game model is developed for this problem by using the leader-follower game approach. Based on the model, given the expected revenue function of supply chain stakeholders, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is obtained. To evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, numerical examples are presented to test the penalty strategies applied to the four frequently incurred situations. The results indicate that the price-dependent quality penalty strategy can

Key words: supply chain, price-dependent quality penalty, leader-follower game, Nash equilibrium