工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2012, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (6): 70-75.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑政府补贴的第三方回收再制造闭环供应链研究

  

  1. 1.山东理工大学 商学院，山东 淄博 255049； 2.淄博市烟草专卖局（公司） 山东 淄博 255000
  • 出版日期:2012-12-31 发布日期:2013-01-15
  • 作者简介:辛广茜(1969-),女,山东省人,副教授,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理的研究.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(71102093);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(12YJAZH114);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(11YJCZH070);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630241);山东理工大学人文社会科学发展基金资助项目(2010ZDXM07);山东理工大学博士启动基金资助项目(2011KQ08)

Research on Closed-Loop Remanufacturing Supply Chain with Third-Party Collection and Government Subsidies

  1. 1. School of Business, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255049, China;
    2. Zibo City Tobacco Monopoly Bureau (Company) , Zibo 255000, China
  • Online:2012-12-31 Published:2013-01-15

摘要： 将政府补贴作为激励函数来处理，构建了考虑政府补贴的第三方回收再制造闭环供应链模型。以博弈论为基本方法，对制造商、销售商和第三方的运作规律及政府补贴对供应链的影响进行了研究。研究发现分散决策模型下，闭环供应链系统没有达到最优。以集中决策模型为标杆，通过设计收益费用共享契约，实现了考虑政府补贴的第三方回收再制造闭环供应链的完美协调。通过算例研究，验证了理论分析的正确性和契约的有效性。

关键词: 政府补贴, 博弈论, 供应链, 供应链协调

Abstract: By taking government subsidy as an incentive function into account, a closedloop remanufacturing supply chain with thirdparty collection is addressed in this paper. A game model is presented to describe the operation of the supply chain. With this model, operational law of the supply chain and the effect of government subsidy are analyzed. It is found that, in the case of noncooperative game, the supply chain system cannot be optimally operated. However, with cooperative game model, perfect coordination of the supply chain can be achieved by using revenue and costsharing contract. A numerical example is used to verify its theoretical correctness and validity of contract design.

Key words: government subsidy, game theory, supply chain, supply chain coordination