工业工程 ›› 2021, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 47-54.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.05.006

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于电商平台的互补产品捆绑策略及销售模式研究

魏杰, 王玉超, 田晨   

  1. 河北工业大学 经济管理学院,天津 300401
  • 收稿日期:2020-04-15 发布日期:2021-11-02
  • 作者简介:魏杰(1975—),男,山东省人,教授,博士,主要研究方向为供应链管理、可持续运营管理
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971076,72171169);河北省自然科学基金资助项目(G2019202344)

Bundling Strategy and Selling Format for Complementary Products Based on Online Platform

WEI Jie, WANG Yuchao, TIAN Chen   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China
  • Received:2020-04-15 Published:2021-11-02

摘要: 为了研究供应商与平台商的最优捆绑策略及销售模式选择问题,基于单个供应商通过电商平台以转销或代销模式销售互补产品的供应链,构建4个Stackelberg博弈模型,分析互补程度和佣金费率对渠道成员均衡价格和利润的影响。结果表明,分开销售时,供应商与平台商的利润随着产品间互补程度的增大而降低;代销捆绑销售对供应商更有利,而转销捆绑销售对平台商更有利;此外,只有当佣金费率大到一定程度时,平台商才倾向于采用代销模式。

关键词: 捆绑策略, 销售模式, 互补产品, 电商平台, 博弈论

Abstract: Based on a supply chain consisting of one supplier who sells complementary products on an e-tailer's online platform through reselling or agency selling format, four Stackelberg game models were formulated to study the supplier's and the e-tailer's optimal bundling strategies and selling formats. The impacts of the degree of complementarity between products and the commission rate on the channel members' equilibrium prices and profits were also analyzed. The results show that the profits of the supplier and the e-tailer decrease as the degree of complementarity between products increases when the products are sold independently. The agency bundling is more advantageous to the supplier, while the reselling bundling is more advantageous to the e-tailer. Moreover, only when the commission rate is large enough, the e-tailer tends to use the agency selling format.

Key words: bundling strategy, selling format, complementary products, online platform, game theory

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