工业工程 ›› 2018, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (6): 64-71,90.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2018.06.009

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于制造商—销售商供应链双向补贴博弈研究

刘欣艺, 张银丹   

  1. 辽宁大学 商学院, 辽宁 沈阳 110136
  • 收稿日期:2018-04-16 出版日期:2018-12-30 发布日期:2018-12-29
  • 作者简介:刘欣艺(1994-),女,辽宁省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为博弈论、高管激励、创新管理
  • 基金资助:
    辽宁省经济社会发展基金资助项目(2018lslktzd-015)

A Research on the Two-way Subsidy Game Based on Manufacturer-Seller Supply Chain

LIU Xinyi, ZHANG Yindan   

  1. Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang 110136, China
  • Received:2018-04-16 Online:2018-12-30 Published:2018-12-29

摘要: 基于制造商对销售商进行广告补贴,销售商对制造商进行研发补贴的异质性供应链合作模式,构建了博弈模型,并提出两种违约风险解决方案。分析论证了制造商研发投入与边际收益正相关,销售商广告投入与边际收益正相关。在制造商单向补贴博弈均衡时,销售商的广告投入与制造商给予的补贴系数的关系由参数决定,销售商的广告投入与制造商的研发投入负相关,补贴系数与制造商边际收益正相关,与销售商边际收益负相关。在制造商—销售商供应链双向补贴博弈均衡时的供应链收益大于单向补贴博弈均衡时的供应链收益。

关键词: 博弈论, 供应链, 双向补贴

Abstract: A game model is built for the heterogeneous supply chain cooperation in which the manufacturer provides the seller with advertising subsidies, and the seller provides the manufacturer with research and development subsidies. And two kinds of default risk solutions are proposed. The analysis demonstrates that the R & D input of the manufacturer is positively correlated with the marginal revenue, and the seller's advertising input is positively correlated with the marginal revenue. In the manufacturer's one-way subsidies game equilibrium, the relationship between the seller's subsidies for advertising and the manufacturer's subsidy coefficient is determined by the parameters and also in this equilibrium, the seller's advertising input is negatively related to the manufacturer's R & D spending, with the subsidy coefficient positively related to the manufacturer's marginal revenue and negatively related to the seller's marginal revenue. In the case of the game equilibrium of the two-way subsidy of the manufacturer-seller supply chain, the supply chain benefit is greater than that of the one-way subsidy game equilibrium.

Key words: game theory, supply chain, two-way subsidy

中图分类号: