工业工程 ›› 2020, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 53-58.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.007

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于博弈论的云制造服务平台价格战应对策略研究

王雪萍1, 谢灿2, 高新勤2, 王珊珊2   

  1. 1. 西安交通大学 经济与金融学院, 陕西 西安 710061;
    2. 西安理工大学 机械与精密仪器工程学院, 陕西 西安 710048
  • 收稿日期:2018-12-28 发布日期:2020-02-21
  • 作者简介:王雪萍(1979-),女,陕西省人,讲师,博士,主要研究方向为金融工程与信息化
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金青年项目资助(14CJY071);国家自然科学基金资助项目(51575443)

Price War Countermeasures of Cloud Manufacturing Service Platform Based on Game Theory

WANG Xueping1, XIE Can2, GAO Xinqin2, WANG Shanshan2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Finance, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710061, China;
    2. School of Mechanical and Precision Instrument Engineering, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, China
  • Received:2018-12-28 Published:2020-02-21

摘要: 在云制造模式下,制造服务提供方的恶意低价或有意降价行为,将导致云制造服务平台出现价格战。本文对云制造服务平台的服务价格、报价商家数目以及一段时期内的成交次数等数据进行分析,得出制造服务提供方和需求方达到一定规模后其制造服务的报价服从正态分布规律的结论。将博弈论引入云制造领域,构建了云制造服务平台实施惩罚与不惩罚策略下制造服务提供方与云制造服务平台的博弈模型,达到了子博弈完美纳什均衡。针对制造服务提供方有意的缓慢降价行为,增加其获取信息的条件限制,从而提高了信息获取的成本。研究结果表明,本文提出的两种价格战应对策略,能够有效抑制制造服务提供方的恶意低价和有意降价行为,保证了云制造服务平台的平稳运行。

关键词: 云制造, 价格分布曲线, 价格战, 博弈论, 信息获取成本

Abstract: Under the cloud manufacturing mode, the malicious low price and intentional price reduction behaviors of manufacturing service providers will lead to a price war on the cloud manufacturing service platform. The data including the service prices, the numbers of manufacturing service providers and the transaction number in a period of time on a cloud manufacturing service platform are analyzed, and a conclusion is drawn that the quotation of manufacturing services obeys the normal distribution law when the manufacturing service providers and demanders reach a certain size. The game theory is introduced into the cloud manufacturing mode, the game models of manufacturing service providers and cloud manufacturing service platform are built under different countermeasures, and the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium is given. Aiming at the deliberate and slow price reduction behavior, the information acquisition cost of the manufacturing service providers with premeditated price reduction is increased by adding the conditional restriction of obtaining information. The research shows that the proposed two price war countermeasures can effectively prevent the manufacturing service providers from the malicious low price and intentional price reduction behaviors, and ensure the stable operation of the cloud manufacturing service platform.

Key words: cloud manufacturing, price distribution curve, price war, game theory, information acquisition cost

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