工业工程 ›› 2014, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (3): 6-12.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

用户创新行为的演化博弈分析

  

  1. 武汉理工大学 管理学院,湖北 武汉 430070
  • 出版日期:2014-06-30 发布日期:2014-07-14
  • 作者简介:郑彤彤(1984-),女,江西省人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为企业战略与创新管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家软科学研究计划(2007GXS1D021);湖北省公益性科技研究项目(2012DCA32001)

An Analysis of Evolutionary Game on the Behavior of User Innovation

  1. School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
  • Online:2014-06-30 Published:2014-07-14

摘要: 基于委托-代理理论和消费者剩余理论等理论框架对用户创新的动机和目的进行分析,认为用户创新行为是对制造商创新行为的补充,也是用户坚持实现个人差异化需求的有效途径。同时,基于有限理性假设,运用演化博弈理论对用户群体与企业群体的合作创新行为进行解析。研究表明,用户群体与企业(制造商)群体的演化博弈模型存在2个演化稳定策略(ESS),来自企业群体和系统外部(例如政府)的激励因素对用户创新均具有积极的刺激作用。

关键词: 用户创新, 有限理性, 演化博弈, 帕累托改进

Abstract:  Based on a connection of principalagent theory and consumer surplus, the motivation and purpose of user innovation are analyzed. It is viewed as a complement to manufacturer innovation and an efficient approach to realize users differentiated demands. Meanwhile, under the hypothesis of bounded rationality, the behavior of user innovation  is explored by using evolutionary game. Results show that two evolutionary stable strategies exist. Also, it is found the motivation factors from firms and external organizations have a positive impact on user innovation.

Key words: user innovation, bounded rationality, evolutionary game, Pareto improvement