Airline Supply Chain Competitive Coordination with Strategic Passenger Behavior

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e17-2044

Abstract

Abstract:

The intermediary agent, which is replaced by possible direct selling, is only assumed to be a follower in the airline supply chain in previous literature. A study is conducted into the competitive supply chain model of two flights in which the revenue sharing proportion is decided by the intermediary agent in the oversupplied competitive market environment with strategic passengers. A competitive game model of two flights is introduced. The revenue of the airline and intermediary agent and the revenue sharing proportion are obtained. The effectiveness of this supply chain is analyzed. Finally, it is found that this model is favorable for airlines when the passenger's buying preferences are small. This model is found superior to the direct selling model from the perspective of revenue.

Key words: revenue sharing contract, strategy passengers, competition, intermediary agent, oversupply

CLC Number:

F272.3

ZOU Liuxin, LI Hao, TAN Meirong. Airline Supply Chain Competitive Coordination with Strategic Passenger Behavior[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2017, 20(4): 101-107,115.

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