A Research on the Remanufacturing Models with Green Customers

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e17-3278

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the coexistence of Primary Customer and Green Customer, the choice of OEM (original equipment manufacturers) and 3PR (third-party remanufacturers) on remanufacturing model is studied. Under the absence and the presence of green consumers, two remanufacturing models of stackelberg game:Outsourcing Remanufacturing and Authorization Remanufacturing, are respectively established. The equilibrium solution and profits of OEM and 3PR under these two models are obtained. The results show that when the proportion of green consumers is high, OEM and 3PR prefer outsourcing to authorization and that when the proportion of green consumers and the acceptance of remanufactured product are both low, 3PR prefers authorization. Moreover, the customer surplus and social welfare are always higher in outsourcing remanufacturing regardless of the proportion of green consumers.

Key words: remanufacture, outsourcing remanufacturing, authorization remanufacturing, green customer

CLC Number:

F274
F224

NIE Jiajia, ZHONG Ling. A Research on the Remanufacturing Models with Green Customers[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2018, 21(2): 9-18.

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