工业工程 ›› 2022, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (6): 136-145.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.06.016

• 实践与应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

市场细分下考虑权力结构的闭环供应链定价决策

徐桂红, 陈荔, 张昕瑞   

  1. 上海理工大学 管理学院,上海 200093
  • 收稿日期:2020-11-04 发布日期:2022-12-23
  • 作者简介:徐桂红(1996—),女,江西省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为闭环供应链决策
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871144)

Pricing Decision of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Power Structure under Market Segmentation

XU Guihong, CHEN Li, ZHANG Xinrui   

  1. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science & Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
  • Received:2020-11-04 Published:2022-12-23

摘要: 考虑消费者对再制品存在认知差异的需求市场,研究不同权力结构下制造与再制造的价格博弈及市场领导权的竞争策略选择问题。建立并求解以原制造商主导 (OL) 、再制造商为市场主导 (RL) 和无市场主导 (NL) 模式下的决策博弈模型。研究表明,NL模式下产品价格和利润最低;一般情况下,产品生产者为市场主导时,产品竞争优势较强,定价最高;两种产品价格差值和再制品需求在OL模式最高,NL模式次之,RL模式最低;新品需求则反之。除OL和RL模式下产品需求差距较小的少数情形外,企业不宜竞争市场领导地位。

关键词: 权力结构, 认知差异, 闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: The price game between manufacturing and remanufacturing under different power structures and the selection of competitive strategies for market leadership were studied in a demand market consisting of consumers with cognitive differences on remanufactured products. The decision game models under three different situations, in which the manufacturer was market leader (OL), the remanufacturer was market leader (RL) and no market leader (NL) were established and solved respectively. The results show that product has the lowest price and profit under NL mode. In general, when the producer is the market leader, the product has a strong competitive advantage and the highest price. The price difference between the two products and the demand for remanufactured products are the highest in OL mode, followed by NL mode and the lowest in RL mode; the demand for manufactured products is on the contrary. Except for a few cases in which the product demand gap between OL and RL mode is small, enterprises should not compete for market leadership.

Key words: power structure, cognitive differences, closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game

中图分类号: