碳交易政策下考虑过度自信的供应链减排决策研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2023.03.002

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为了研究碳交易政策下供应链成员过度自信心理对供应链减排决策的影响，以一个低碳制造商与一个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象，分别构建供应链成员完全理性、仅制造商过度自信、仅零售商过度自信以及供应链成员均过度自信4种Stackelberg博弈模型，对比分析各模式下供应链的减排策略，为企业减排策略提供理论依据。研究发现如下结果。1) 在碳交易政策下，制造商过度自信时，无论市场环境如何，制造商利润都会上涨，零售商利润则会小幅下降；零售商过度自信时，市场环境较好，则制造商利润上涨，零售商利润下降，市场环境较差则情况相反。2) 在不同的碳交易价格下，零售商利润随制造商过度自信的增加会出现不同的变化趋势。当碳交易价格较高时，零售商利润随制造商过度自信的增加会出现先上升后下降的趋势；当碳交易价格较低时，零售商利润随制造商过度自信的增加而减少。3) 与供应链成员理性的情况相比，制造商过度自信或零售商过度自信均提高了产品的减排率，并且这种影响随着碳交易价格的上涨而变大。

关键词: 碳交易政策, 过度自信, 减排决策, 博弈论

Abstract: In order to study the influence of overconfidence psychology of supply chain members on supply chain emission reduction decisions under carbon trading policies, taking a supply chain composed of a low carbon manufacturer and a retailer as the studied object, four Stackelberg game models are established respectively, including complete rationality of supply chain members, manufacturer overconfidence only, retailer overconfidence only and overconfidence of both supply chain members. Comparative analysis of supply chain emission reduction strategy for each model is conducted to provide theoretical basis for enterprise emission reduction strategies. Results are as follows. 1) Under carbon trading policies, when the manufacturer is overconfident, its profits rise regardless of the market environment, while the retailer profits decrease slightly; when the retailer is overconfident, the manufacturer profits rise and the retailer profits decline when the market environment is good, otherwise when the market environment is bad. 2) Under different carbon trading prices, the retailer profits show different trends with the increase of manufacturer overconfidence. When the carbon trading price is high, the retailer profits increase first and then decrease with the increase of manufacturer overconfidence; when the carbon trading price is low, the retailer profits decrease with the increase of manufacturer overconfidence. 3) Compared with the situation of rational supply chain members, overconfidence of manufacturers or retailers improves the emission reduction rate of products, and this effect becomes large as carbon trading prices rise.

Key words: carbon trading policy, overconfidence, emission reduction decision, game theory

中图分类号:

F274
F224

孙立成, 于锦涵, 王雨时. 碳交易政策下考虑过度自信的供应链减排决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2023, 26(3): 8-17,28.

SUN Licheng, YU Jinhan, WANG Yushi. Supply Chain Emission Reduction Decisions Considering Overconfidence under Carbon Trading Policies[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2023, 26(3): 8-17,28.

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