工业工程 ›› 2012, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (6): 63-69.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

随机弹性需求下的再制造闭环供应链的协调机制研究

  

  1. 1.东南大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189; 2.青岛大学 国际商学院,山东 青岛 266071
  • 出版日期:2012-12-31 发布日期:2013-01-15
  • 作者简介:黄永(1987-),男,河南省人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为逆向供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772059)

Coordination of Closed-Loop Remanufacturing Supply Chain with Stochastic and Flexible Demands

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China; 
    2. International Business College, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
  • Online:2012-12-31 Published:2013-01-15

摘要: 在价格敏感型随机需求的闭环供应链中,分析了以制造商为Stackelberg领导的集中式决策与3种分散式回收模式(制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收)下的定价策略和系统利润。首先从集中式决策出发得到闭环供应链协调的一阶必要条件,在分散决策中证明了完全退货与回馈惩罚混合契约能使分散式闭环供应链达到完美协调,实现供应链成员的共赢,通过协调时利润的比较表明制造商不会选择第三方回收模式,最后证明了协调的充分性和有效性,并给出了一个算例验证了上述结论。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 再制造, 契约协调, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: In this paper, a closedloop remanufacturing supply chain with pricesensitive stochastic demands is addressed. Such a supply chain can be operated under centralized decisionmaking mode with the manufacturer as Stackelberg leader and three decentralized usedproduct collection modes: manufacturer, retailer, and thirdparty collection. For such a supply chain, pricing policy and profit are analyzed under centralized and decentralized modes, respectively. Under centralized decisionmaking mode, a firstorder necessary condition for coordinating the supply chain is derived. Then, it is shown that, under decentralized decisionmaking mode, the supply chain can be perfectly coordinated by using a compound contract with total return policy, and sale rebate and penalty. In this way, winwin can be achieved. By comparison, it also shows that thirdparty collection cant be chosen by the manufacturer. Coordination sufficiency and efficiency are also analyzed. A numerical example is given to verify the proposed method.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, remanufacturing, contract coordination, Stackelberg game