工业工程 ›› 2020, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 35-43,58.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.005

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

放弃制造商品牌?——制造商入侵与自有品牌引入的博弈分析

刘盾, 宋慧玲, 聂佳佳   

  1. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院, 成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2019-03-13 发布日期:2020-02-21
  • 作者简介:刘盾(1983-),男,重庆市人,教授,主要研究方向为系统决策与分析
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(61876157, 71571148, 71672153);西南交通大学“双一流”建设资助项目(JDSYLYB2018020)

Give up the National Brand? —A Game Analysis between Supplier Encroachment and Store Brand Introduction

LIU Dun, SONG Huiling, NIE Jiajia   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
  • Received:2019-03-13 Published:2020-02-21

摘要: 研究直销渠道和零售渠道以及制造商品牌和自有品牌之间的竞争关系。考虑了零售商放弃销售制造商品牌产品的情形,分析了6种情境下的博弈模型,得出了供应链成员的博弈均衡策略和利润,进一步探讨了不同参数对供应链双方策略选择的影响。结果表明,零售商放弃销售制造商品牌产品的充分条件是自有品牌产品生产成本小于制造商品牌产品生产成本。此时,如果制造商品牌产品生产成本和直销运营成本较小,且自有品牌产品生产成本接近于制造商品牌产品生产成本,制造商入侵;否则,制造商拒绝开通直销渠道。

关键词: 制造商品牌, 自有品牌, 直销渠道, 博弈论

Abstract: A study is conducted on the competition not only between direct channel and retail channel but between national brand and store brand. By considering the situation that the supplier opens up a direct channel, and the retailer gives up selling the national brand and introduce the store brand, the non-cooperative game between retailers and suppliers is investigated under six scenarios. The research draws on different Nash equilibrium strategies and profits, further exploring the impact of different parameters on the strategic choices of both sides of the supply chain. Results indicates that, the retailer gives up selling the national brand when the production cost of store brand is less than the production cost of national brand. At this time, if the production cost of national brand and the direct selling cost are small, and the production cost of store brand is close to the production cost of national brand, the supplier encroaches; otherwise, the supplier refuses to open up a direct channel.

Key words: national brand, store brand, direct channel, game theory

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