再制造闭环供应链系统的合作分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了一个由制造商、销售商以及回收商组成的闭环供应链，采用博弈理论分析了差异策略下不同合作程度对于新产品和再制造产品的价格、销售量以及废旧产品回收率等决策量的影响。结论显示，在一定的假设条件下，制造商通过提高与销售商或回收商的合作程度能够增加自身收益，并且供应链总利润将随着合作程度的增大而增加；同时制造商与销售商、回收商的这两种合作关系之间也会产生相互作用。在文章最后提出了进行成员间利润再分配的协调建议。

关键词: 闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈, 合作博弈, 再制造

Abstract: A closed-loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one dealer, and one recycler is considered. Based on differentiate-pricing strategy, Stackelberg game theory is used to analyze the effect of cooperation level on pricing, sales, and product returning rate. Results reveal that the manufacturer has more profit gain through the building of partnership with the dealer and recycler. And, along with the increase of cooperation level, the profits of the whole supply chain increase. At the same time, the cooperative relationship of the manufacturer with the dealer and the recycler can result in mutual interaction in building sale and product return channel. Based on the analysis, suggestions are made for coordination improvement by profit redistribution.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game, cooperative game, remanufacturing

司文静, 马军海. 再制造闭环供应链系统的合作分析[J]. 工业工程, 2013, 16(1): 86-90.

Si Wen-jing, Ma Jun-hai. Cooperation Analysis of a Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Remanufacturing[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2013, 16(1): 86-90.

参考文献

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