Industrial Engineering Journal ›› 2022, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (5): 81-89.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2022.05.010

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A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Extended Warranty Service for Remanufactured Products under Government Restricted Control Policies

ZHU Xiaodong, DING Lian, GUO Yajie   

  1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China
  • Received:2021-06-27 Published:2022-10-20

Abstract: By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the consumer, the remanufacturer and the government to determine the payoff matrice and the replicator dynamic equation, and the impact of government restricted control policies on the development of extended warranty industry is explored. Based on the life cycle theory, the evolution path between the three key stages of industry development is simulated, and the impact of key parameters on the evolution result is analyzed. The results show that in the initial stage of industry development, the government can increase the subsidy promote the evolution of the extended warranty industry to the middle stage. In the middle stage, the government needs to reasonably control the incentives and penalty to ensure that all three parties in the game can profit from it. In the mature stage, environmental problems have been greatly improved. Active regulation has marginal diminishing returns, and the government should adopt a passive control strategy. The failure rate of the remanufactured product will affect the final evolution strategy of each game player. An excessively high failure rate may cause system disorders. The remanufacturer and the government need to actively take measures to ensure product quality.

Key words: remanufactured products, extended warranty policy, circular economy, evolutionary game, life cycle theory, government restricted control policies

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