Industrial Engineering Journal ›› 2023, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (3): 18-28.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2023.03.003

• System Analysis & Management Decision • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Lightweight Commercial Vehicle Supply Chains under External Effects of Carbon Emission Reduction and Overloading Prohibition

XING Qingsong1,2, ZHONG Wanqiu1, PENG Xin1, DENG Fumin2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China;
    2. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
  • Received:2021-11-30 Published:2023-07-08

Abstract: Light commercial vehicles are the most promising feasible technique route of long-distance green freight transportation for highway traffic, after implementing the carbon emission policy under the "double carbon" target and the overloading prohibition policy. To promote the steady development of their supply chains, on the basis of analyzing evolutionary game decision-making behavior of different main bodies, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model with manufacturers, distributors, consumers as the main body. The behavior strategy of the main body in the evolutionary stable state is given. Furthermore, through establishing a system dynamics model, the strategy selection of stakeholders in different situations and the influence of external variable changes on the stability strategy of system evolution are analyzed. Results show that: there are two evolutionary forms of consumer demand and market structure transformation under the external effects of policies and regulations including induced and mandatory forms, which are related to the slow-release cycle of policies and regulations; when the slow-release cycle is long, in order to adapt to market structure changes, manufacturers actively participate in the product sector structure optimization before consumers, inducing consumer demand adjustment, and evolving the lightweight commercial vehicle supply chain to a stable state after a long period of time; when the slow-release cycle is short or non-existent, the benefit path dependence of consumers is blocked. Considering the sustainability of employment and operation, consumers are forced by the external effects of policies and regulations to adjust demand, participate in the light commercial vehicle supply chain and promote the participation of manufacturers and dealers through the demand "pull" and the policies and regulations external effect "push", ultimately achieving a stable state of the supply chain evolution in a relatively short period; finally, the dynamic adjustment in the slow-release cycle of policies and regulations should be synchronized with technical iterations, such that policies and regulations can play a better role on the external effects to form a two-way feedback mechanism on both sides of supply and demand, which is conducive to the evolution of a lightweight commercial vehicle supply chain to a stable state in a relatively short period of time.

Key words: “double carbon” target, carbon emissions, overloading prohibition, lightweight commercial vehicles, evolutionary game

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