直接回收渠道下闭环供应链防范零售商合谋的机制设计

工业工程 ›› 2015, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (5): 40-46.

直接回收渠道下闭环供应链防范零售商合谋的机制设计

（广东工业大学管理学院，广东广州 510520）

出版日期:2015-10-31 发布日期:2016-03-24
作者简介:杨倩霞（1990-），女，广东省人，硕士研究生，主要研究方向为供应链管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (71101032)；高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20104420120008)

Prevention Mechanism Design on Retailer Collusion in a Closed-loop Supply Chain with Direct Recycling Channel

(School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China)

Online:2015-10-31 Published:2016-03-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了单一制造商和两个竞争的零售商组成的闭环供应链系统中制造商防范零售商合谋的机制设计问题。研究表明,零售商合谋损害了闭环供应链系统和制造商的利润，增加了自身的利润；并提高了销售价格，从而损害了消费者的利益；零售商合谋给制造商带来的损失随着竞争程度的增加而增加；防范机制可减少制造商因零售商合谋而导致的利润损失，但并不能达到零售商不合谋时的利润水平。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 零售商合谋, 防范机制

Abstract: The mechanism preventing retailer collusion in a one-manufacturer-two-competing-retailers closed-loop supply chain is studied. The result indicates that retailer collusion, while increasing their own profits, decreases profits of closedloop supply chain system and manufacturers and raise the sales price, thus harming the interests of customers. Prevention mechanism can reduce the profit loss of manufacturers caused by the retailer collusion, but it cannot achieve the profit level in the absence of retailer collusion. Prevention mechanism can reduce the profit loss of manufacturers brought by the retailer collusion, but it cannot achieve the profit level in the absence of retailer collusion.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, retailer collusion, prevention mechanism

杨倩霞，韩小花. 直接回收渠道下闭环供应链防范零售商合谋的机制设计[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(5): 40-46.

Yang Qian-xia, Han Xiao-hua. Prevention Mechanism Design on Retailer Collusion in a Closed-loop Supply Chain with Direct Recycling Channel[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2015, 18(5): 40-46.

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