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政府奖励不同主体下的废弃电子产品回收机制设计

  

  1. 1.南京财经大学 营销与物流管理学院，江苏 南京 210023；2.华东交通大学 经济管理学院,江西 南昌 330013; 3.合肥工业大学 管理学院,安徽 合肥 230009
     
  • 出版日期:2016-04-30 发布日期:2016-05-27
  • 作者简介:倪明(1974-)，男，安徽省人，教授,博士，主要研究方向为物流系统及其信息化工程.
  • 基金资助:

     国家自然科学基金资助项目(71262011,71261005);中国博士后科学基金资助项目 (2014M551804)；江西省青年科学家培养计划资助项目(20122BCB23009);江西省自然科学基金资助项目（20122BAB201041）;江西省高等学校科技落地计划资助项目（KJLD13040 ）;江西省赣鄱英才555工程资助项目（赣组［2013］58号）;江西省社科规划资助项目（13GL02）;中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目（2013HGBH0286）;江西省教育厅科技资助项目（GJJ13328）

A Study of the Recycling Mechanism of Waste Electronic Products Based on the Government Rewarding Towards Different Participants

  1. 1.School of Marketing and Logistics Management , Nanjing University of Finance & Economics, Nanjing 210023, China；2. College of Economics and Management, East China Jiao Tong University, Nanchang 330013, China;3.School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009， China
  • Online:2016-04-30 Published:2016-05-27

摘要：

用博弈论分别求解并比较了政府奖励制造商、制造商与消费者、制造商与零售商3种分散式决策模型。研究得出：政府的奖励机制对制造商的利润有直接影响；在仅奖励制造商模式下，废弃电子产品回收量显著提高；在奖励制造商与消费者、制造商与零售商两种模式下，废弃电子产品回收量的提高不显著。最后，根据研究结果提出政府应规范回收费用标准和确定零售商负责回收责任。

关键词: 废弃电子产品, 回收, 奖励机制, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

 Three distributed decision-making Stackelberg models are established, including model of government rewarding the manufacturer, model of government rewarding the manufacturer and the consumer and model of government rewarding the manufacturer and the retailer, and finally an example is given testing the models. Results have shown that the premium mechanisms make an impact on the optimal profit of the manufacturer. It is more effective for the manufacturer to improve the collecting quantity of WEP in the mechanisms of rewarding the manufacturer than in the other models. Finally, the roposal is put forward that the government should regulate the recycling fee standards and determine the retailer’s recycle responsibility.