Abstract: In order to solve the problem of enterprises seeking rent from third-party professional organizations and lacking government supervision in logistics regulation, a tripartite evolutionary game model is established with port logistics enterprises, third-party professional organizations and port administrative departments. The evolutionary equilibrium law in logistics regulation is revealed through model solving and numerical simulation. Results show that the reward and punishment set by port administrative departments must satisfy the condition that the sum of reward and punishment for each party is greater than its respective speculative gain such that the combination of strategies (compliant operation, rejection of rent-seeking, and loose regulation) can be a stable evolutionary strategy; increasing the intensity of both reward and punishment is beneficial to the compliant operation of enterprises and also the implementation of third-party professional organizations to reject rent-seeking strategies, however, as the reward intensity increases, the supervision willingness of port administrative departments decreases, also its effect weakens; the evolution of enterprises toward compliant operation can be facilitated by improving the reputation gain of enterprises, increasing rent-seeking costs and the accountability for government failures.

Key words: port hazardous chemicals, third-party professional organizations, rent-seeking behavior, evolutionary game, simulation analysis