工业工程 ›› 2014, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (1): 112-119.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

低碳需求约束下制造商技术创新决策的比较分析

  

  1. 重庆交通大学 财经学院,重庆 400074
  • 出版日期:2014-02-28 发布日期:2014-03-14
  • 作者简介:梁喜(1978-),男,江苏省人,副教授,博士,硕士生导师,重庆大学管理科学与工程在站博士后,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理研究.
  • 基金资助:

    重庆市自然科学基金一般项目(2012jjA1066)

A Comparative Analysis of Emission Reduction through Technology- Innovation of Manufacturers under Low Carbon Demand Constraints

  1. College of Finance & Economics, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
  • Online:2014-02-28 Published:2014-03-14

摘要: 为了分析消费者低碳需求约束的影响,在单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链系统中,通过在需求函数中引入减排技术创新水平参数,采用stackelberg博弈方法,构建了占主导地位的制造商实施减排技术创新是否有利可图的决策模型。分析了制造商不实施、单独实施以及与零售商联合实施技术创新3种情形对供应链成员定价与利润的影响。研究表明,制造商的减排技术创新决策不仅会受到消费者低碳需求的约束,而且也会受到零售商销售成本的制约,当满足一定条件时,制造商单独实施创新可以使制造商与零售商的价格与利润都高于不实施创新情形,而制造商与零售商联合创新却不一定是最优选择,零售商销售成本在一定程度上会制约制造商与零售商联合创新的效果。

关键词: 碳排放, 减排, 低碳, 技术创新, 供应链管理

Abstract: In view of a secondary supply chain system composed of one manufacturer and one retailer, a judgment model is built to analyze how the prevailing manufacturer can carry out emission reduction through technology innovation under low carbon demand constraints. By introducing the parameter of technical innovation level, Stackelberg Game theory is used to analyze the impacts of the manufacturer decisions with or without technology innovation on the prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. The results show that the prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are higher with the manufacturer's technology innovation only than without technology innovation under certain conditions. The joint innovation of the manufacturer and the retailer is not always the dominant strategy, the effect of which is constrained by the distribution costs of the retailer.

Key words: carbon emissions, emission reduction, low carbon, technology innovation, supply chain management