考虑风险规避与零售商谎报行为的绿色供应链决策研究

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.01.003

工业工程 ›› 2021, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 19-26,34.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.01.003

考虑风险规避与零售商谎报行为的绿色供应链决策研究

宋英华^1,2, 曹雪竹^1,2, 刘丹^1,2

1. 武汉理工大学中国应急管理研究中心，湖北武汉 430070;
2. 武汉理工大学安全科学与应急管理学院，湖北武汉 430070

收稿日期:2020-01-29 发布日期:2021-02-24
通讯作者: 刘丹(1985-)，男，湖南省人，副教授，博士，主要研究方向为决策理论与方法、复杂系统建模与仿真等。E-mail：liudan8575@whut.edu.cn E-mail:liudan8575@whut.edu.cn
作者简介:宋英华(1962-)，男，湖北省人，教授，博士，主要研究方向为公共管理、危机与灾害应急管理、决策理论与方法等
基金资助:
国家重点研发专项基金资助项目(2018YFC0807000)；国家社会科学基金资助项目(16CTQ022)；国家自然科学基金资助项目(51604204)

A Research on Green Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Risk Avoidance and Retailer's Falsification Behavior

SONG Yinghua^1,2, CAO Xuezhu^1,2, LIU Dan^1,2

1. China Research Center for Emergency Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China;
2. School of Safety Science and Emergency Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China

Received:2020-01-29 Published:2021-02-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为解决二级绿色供应链的产品定价和绿色度决策问题，以零售商具有销售成本信息优势，存在谎报行为为背景，考虑供应链成员具有风险规避特性，通过设计谎报系数，构建集中决策模型与供应商主导Stackelberg博弈模型，分别推导谎报情形下的最优批发价、绿色度和零售价，研究风险规避程度及谎报程度对决策的影响。利用数值仿真验证结论并进行参数敏感性分析。结果表明，集中决策模式下，成员风险规避行为和零售商谎报行为均导致绿色产品批发价和绿色度减小。分散决策模式下，存在零售商风险规避因子拐点，谎报行为对产品最优批发价、绿色度、零售价分别产生正向和负向影响；谎报系数为1.05时，零售商期望利润达到峰值；当谎报系数变动，最优零售价最为敏感，其次为最优绿色度，最后为最优批发价。

关键词: 绿色供应链决策, 风险规避, 信息不对称, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: The determination of the product green degree and pricing of the second-level green supply chain is focused on. With the retailer's advantage in sales cost information and the existence of false reporting as the background, the supply chain members' risk aversion characteristics are considered, false reporting coefficients are designed, a centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model are established to get the optimal wholesale price, green degree and retail price in the case of misreporting, and the impact of risk aversion and the degree of misreporting on decision-making is analyzed. The conclusions are verified through a numerical analysis and a parameters sensitivity analysis. The results show that: under centralized decision, the risk aversion of members and the misrepresentation of retailers all lead to a reduction in the wholesale price and greenness of green products. Under decentralized decision, there is an inflection point of the retailer's risk aversion factor and the false reporting behavior has positive and negative effects on the product's optimal wholesale price, greenness, and retail price, respectively;when the false report coefficient is 1.05, the retailer expects profits reach the maximum value; when the false report coefficient changes, the optimal retail price is the most sensitive, followed by the optimal green degree, and finally the optimal wholesale price.

Key words: green supply chain decision, risk aversion, information asymmetry, Stackelberg game

中图分类号:

F274
F224

宋英华, 曹雪竹, 刘丹. 考虑风险规避与零售商谎报行为的绿色供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(1): 19-26,34.

SONG Yinghua, CAO Xuezhu, LIU Dan. A Research on Green Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Risk Avoidance and Retailer's Falsification Behavior[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2021, 24(1): 19-26,34.

参考文献

[1] 国务院办公厅. 关于积极推进供应链创新与应用的指导意见[EB/OL].[2017-10-13].http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-10/13/content_5231524.html.
[2] SRIVASTAVA S K. Green supplychain management: a state-of-the-art literature review[J]. International Journal of Management Reviews, 2007, 9(1): 53-80
[3] 刘文强, 周明明. 中国制造业绿色供应链发展研究报告(2018)[M]. 北京: 电子工业出版社, 2019: 23-31.
[4] LI B, HOU P W, CHEN P, et al. Pricing strategy and coordination in a dual channel supply chain with a risk-averse retailer[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 178: 154-168
[5] ZHOU Y W, LI J, ZHONG Y. Cooperative advertising and ordering policies in a two-echelon supply chain with risk-averse agents[J]. Omega, 2018, 75: 97-117
[6] 姜丽宁, 崔文田, 林军. 不同风险态度下目标回扣契约对供应链的协调[J]. 统计与决策, 2013, 29(14): 46-49
JIANG Lining, CUI Wentian, LIN Jun. Coordination of supply chain with target rebate contract under different risk attitudes[J]. Journal of Statistics and Decision, 2013, 29(14): 46-49
[7] 徐广业, 张旭梅. 风险规避下基于价格折扣的双渠道供应链协调[J]. 系统管理学报, 2016, 25(6): 1114-1120
XU Guangye, ZHANG Xumei. Coordinating the dual-channel risk-averse supply chain based on price discount[J]. Journal of Systems & Management, 2016, 25(6): 1114-1120
[8] HUYNH C H, PAN W. Operational strategies for supplier and retailer with risk preference under VMI contract[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 169: 413-421
[9] 窦品品. 考虑零售商风险喜好的绿色供应链收益共享契约机制研究[J]. 物流工程与管理, 2017, 39(11): 88-89
DOU Pinpin. Research on the revenue sharing contract of green supply chain with retailer’s risk-taking[J]. Logistics Engineering and Management, 2017, 39(11): 88-89
[10] 曲优, 关志民, 叶同, 等. 基于混合Cvar的供应链绿色研发-广告决策与协调机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(10): 89-101
QU You, GUAN Zhiming, YE Tong, et al. Supply chain coordination for green innovation-advertisement decisions based on mixture Cvar criterion[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(10): 89-101
[11] 江世英, 李随成, 王欢. 考虑风险规避的绿色供应链定价决策[J]. 系统工程, 2016, 34(3): 94-100
JIANG Shiying, LI Suicheng, WANG Huan. Pricing decision of green supply chain considering risk aversion[J]. Systems Engineering, 2016, 34(3): 94-100
[12] HA A Y. Supplier-buyer contracting: asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation[J]. Naval Research Logistics, 2001, 48(1): 41-64
[13] YAN B, WANG T, LIU Y-P, et al. Decision analysis of retailer-dominated dual-channel supply chain considering cost misreporting[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 178: 34-41
[14] CAO E, MA Y, WAN C, et al. Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain[J]. Operations Research Letters, 2013, 41(4): 410-414
[15] 刘茜, 马吉睿. 信息共享下绿色供应链价格协调问题研究[J]. 物流技术, 2008, 27(12): 97-101
LIU Xi, MA Jirui. Research on green supply chain price-coordination based on information sharing[J]. Logistics Technology, 2008, 27(12): 97-101
[16] 高鹏, 聂佳佳, 谢忠秋. 存在绿色消费者的再制造供应链信息分享策略[J]. 管理工程学报, 2014, 28(4): 193-200
GAO Peng, NIE Jiajia, XIE Zhongqiu. Strategies of information sharing in supply chain with remanufacturing considering the existence of green consumers[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2014, 28(4): 193-200
[17] 士明军, 王勇, 但斌, 等. 绿色供应链中不对称需求预测下的信息共享研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(4): 104-114
SHI Mingjun, WANG Yong, DAN Bin, et al. Information sharing in a green supply chain with asymmetric demand forecasts[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(4): 104-114
[18] YANG L, JI J, ZHENG C. Impact of asymmetric carbon information on supply chain decisions under low-carbon policies[J]. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2016, 2016(6): 1-16
[19] 冯颖, 刘真. TPL参与的生鲜农产品供应链成本谎报行为分析[J]. 软科学, 2017, 31(9): 133-137
FENG Ying, LIU Zhen. Analysis of cost misreporting in a fresh agri-products supply chain with TPL's participation[J]. Soft Science, 2017, 31(9): 133-137
[20] 屈绍建, 卢艳玲, 纪颖. 社交网络推送下的众筹融资机制分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(3): 1-10
QU Shaojian, LU Yanling, JI Ying. The analysis of crowdfunding financing mechanism based on social networks[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(3): 1-10
[21] 江世英, 马春艳. 考虑零售商风险态度的绿色供应链契约协调模型[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(3): 30-35
JIANG Shiying, MA Chunyan. Contract and game models of green supply chain with risk-averse retailer[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2015, 18(3): 30-35
[22] GHOSH D, SHAH J. Acomparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 135(2): 568-583
[23] LI L. Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition[J]. Management Science, 2002, 48(9): 1196-1212
[24] SHU L L, QU S J, WU Z. Supply chain coordination with optimal pricing and logistics service decision in online retailing[J]. Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, 2020, 45(3): 2247-2261

考虑风险规避与零售商谎报行为的绿色供应链决策研究

A Research on Green Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Risk Avoidance and Retailer's Falsification Behavior

RichHTML

PDF

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

编辑推荐

Metrics

本文评价

[1]	田永杰. 经销商公平偏好的供应链合作广告策略研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 67-75.
[2]	吴春尚. 基于Stackelberg博弈模型的不同主导权的三级农产品电商供应链决策分析[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 160-167.
[3]	陈佳媛, 周刚. 不同主导权结构下服务水平对高铁快递供应链价格策略的影响[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(4): 168-176.
[4]	黄帅, 杨玉中. 基于互补产品的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(3): 153-160.
[5]	李芳, 马艳, 王豪丽. 制造商主导下差别主体努力的闭环供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(2): 27-33.
[6]	孙利辉, 吕静, 张磊, 高鹏. 基于消费者风险规避的社区支持农业合作机制[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(1): 59-65.
[7]	张光明, 江浩, 陶莹. 考虑搭便车和风险规避的零售商定价、渠道选择策略[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(6): 10-17.
[8]	邢光军, 李云云. 考虑消费者绿色偏好的竞争性闭环供应链生产决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(5): 22-29.
[9]	朱琳, 窦祥胜. 考虑风险态度的绿色供应链定价策略及政府补贴政策分析[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(5): 158-168.
[10]	唐毅青, 陈雪甍, 谭德庆. 风险规避与信用担保比例对供应链融资选择的影响[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(4): 18-27.
[11]	肖敏, 张耀. 双重干预及产能约束下的闭环供应链决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(4): 28-35.
[12]	张子健, 郭明波, 陈全朋. EPR下动力电池梯度利用的闭环供应链定价策略与协调机制[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(3): 10-18.
[13]	舒秘. 不同渠道结构下再制造商进入对制造商定价的影响[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(3): 30-37.
[14]	石永强, 王佳欣, 张智勇. 基于博弈论的两级逆向供应链定价策略研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(3): 45-50,58.
[15]	林强, 陈林, 甯清万, 秦星红. 不同主导力量下考虑公平偏好的旅游供应链定价策略[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(1): 87-95.