工业工程

工业工程 ›› 2011, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (6): 10-15.

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    下一篇

多供应链间的Nash和Stackelberg博弈决策模型

  

  1. 1.华南理工大学 工商管理学院，广东 广州 510640；2.合肥工业大学 理学院，安徽 合肥 230009
  • 出版日期:2011-12-31 发布日期:2011-12-23

On the Nash and Stackelberg Game among Multiple Supply Chains

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China;
    2. School of Sciences, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China
  • Online:2011-12-31 Published:2011-12-23

摘要：  以N条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的单链式供应链为研究对象，分别讨论了多供应链间Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈问题，对N条供应链间博弈均衡解进行了分析和求解，证明了N条供应链博弈下均衡解的存在性和唯一性。在实例分析中，以两条供应链为例，比较了不同博弈框架下定价策略和系统利润的差异。结果表明，对于供应链1来说，链间Nash博弈时的零售商利润、制造商利润和供应链利润均大于链间Stackelberg博弈情形，也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度，他们均乐于放弃作为领导者的先动优势；对于供应链2来说，情况则相反，也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度，他们均乐于作为追随者发挥后动优势。

关键词: 多供应链竞争, 博弈理论, Nash博弈, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:  In this paper, the competition issue among multiple supply chains is addressed. The supply chain considered is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both Nash and Stackelberg game models are developed for the problem. It is shown that there is a unique equilibrium for both models. For the twosupplychain scenario, the system profit obtained under different pricing strategy is compared between these two game models. It is found that, for supply chain 1, the profit of retailer, manufacturer, and the whole supply chain obtained under the Nash game is greater than that obtained under the Stackelberg game. This implies that anyone of the retailer, manufacturer, and the whole supply chain is willing to give up the firstmover advantage as a leader. However, in contrast to supply chain 1, for supply chain 2, anyone of the retailer, manufacturer, and the whole supply chain want to act as the follower and exert the latemover advantage.

Key words: competition of multisupply chains, game theory, Nash game, Stackelberg game