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零售商主导下考虑增值物流服务的供应链期权契约协调

  

  1. 1.中国矿业大学 管理学院，江苏 徐州 221116；2.南京大学 工程管理学院，江苏 南京 210093
  • 出版日期:2016-12-31 发布日期:2017-02-22
  • 作者简介:冯颖（1981-），女，山东省人，副教授，博士,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71201164）；教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目（15YJC630018）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（2013W12）

Coordination Mechanism in a Retailer-led Supply Chain Considering -Value-added Logistics Service Based on an Option Contract

  1. 1.School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China; 2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
  • Online:2016-12-31 Published:2017-02-22

摘要：

在零售商为主导者，生产商为跟随者且承担物流服务的模式下，考虑物流服务价值增值，建立了物流服务水平影响市场需求情形下的两级Stackelberg博弈模型。研究表明，分散决策下生产商的生产量和物流服务水平均低于集中决策下的结果，引入期权契约和物流服务成本共担契约可同时协调生产量和物流服务水平。最后，通过算例验证了上述契约组合的可行性，改变物流服务成本分担比例的取值，分析了零售商期权价格、期望利润以及第一次订购产品量的变化情况。

关键词: 供应链管理, 期权契约协调, Stackelberg博弈, 增值物流服务

Abstract:

The system operates under a mode in which the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader while the manufacturer, the follower, is responsible for the transportation. Considering the value-added logistics service, a two-stage Stackelberg game model is developed under the situation that the logistics service influences the market demand. Research shows that the manufacturer′s production and logistics service level in decentralized system are lower than the corresponding results in the centralized one. Then, an option contract and a logistics service cost sharing contract are introduced into the system which can coordinate the system effectively. Finally, the feasibility of the above contract combination is verified by a numerical example, with changes of option price, initial ordering quantity and expected profit with respect to the logistics service cost sharing coefficient all analyzed.

Key words: supply chain management, option contract coordination, Stackelberg game, valueadded logistics service