考虑消费者激励因素的智能电网多零售商多用户实时定价策略

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3168

工业工程 ›› 2017, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (1): 12-19.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.e16-3168

考虑消费者激励因素的智能电网多零售商多用户实时定价策略

代业明^1,2, 高岩¹, 朱红波¹, 金锋³, 袁光辉⁴

1. 上海理工大学管理学院, 上海 200093;
2. 青岛大学数学与统计学院, 山东青岛 266071;
3. IBM中国上海研究院, 上海 201203;
4. 上海财经大学信息管理与工程学院, 上海 200433

收稿日期:2016-06-11 出版日期:2017-02-28 发布日期:2017-03-13
作者简介:代业明(1975-),男,河南省人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为电网定价机制、博弈论及其应用.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（11171221）；高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目（20123120110004）；美国IBM公司共享大学项目（SUR）

Real-time Pricing Scheme Considering Incentive Factor between Multi-retailers and Multi-users in Smart Grid

DAI Yeming^1,2, GAO Yan¹, ZHU Hongbo¹, JIN Feng³, YUAN Guanghui⁴

1. School of Management, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China;
2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China;
3. IBM China Research Laboratory, Shanghai 201203, China;
4. School of Information Management and Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2016-06-11 Online:2017-02-28 Published:2017-03-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 作为智能电网需求响应管理（demand response management，DRM）的关键组成部分，实时电价定价机制已经成为近年来研究热点之一。为更好地优化能源消费，针对智能电网中多个电力零售商和多个用户之间的策略互动行为，运用博弈方法建立一个多主多从的Stackelberg博弈模型进行实时电价研究，证明和分析了Stackelberg均衡的存在性，并设计分布式算法以求解仅具有局部信息情形下的博弈均衡解。此外，提出一个用于调节零售商实时电价信息的激励因子来用于分析电力系统运行稳定性及电力供需平衡状态。仿真模拟结果验证了所提算法可以快速收敛，并且适当的激励可以提高用户满意度。

关键词: 智能电网, 需求响应管理, 实时电价, 激励因子, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: As a crucial part of demand response management (DRM) in smart grid, real-time pricing has become one of the open research hot spots. In order to optimize energy consumption, a Stackelberg game model is established to study the real-time pricing in view of the interaction behaviors between multiple power retailers and multiple users by using game theory. The existence of equilibrium is proved and analyzed. After that, a distributed algorithm is proposed to solve the equilibrium with only local information. In addition, an incentive factor for regulating the real-time electricity price information of retailers is put forward for keeping the power system operation stability and power supply and demand balance. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed algorithm converges quickly and the appropriate incentive factors may improve the satisfaction of users.

Key words: smart grid, demand response management, real-time pricing, incentive factor, Stackelberg game

中图分类号:

O225
TM73

代业明, 高岩, 朱红波, 金锋, 袁光辉. 考虑消费者激励因素的智能电网多零售商多用户实时定价策略[J]. 工业工程, 2017, 20(1): 12-19.

DAI Yeming, GAO Yan, ZHU Hongbo, JIN Feng, YUAN Guanghui. Real-time Pricing Scheme Considering Incentive Factor between Multi-retailers and Multi-users in Smart Grid[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal , 2017, 20(1): 12-19.

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考虑消费者激励因素的智能电网多零售商多用户实时定价策略

Real-time Pricing Scheme Considering Incentive Factor between Multi-retailers and Multi-users in Smart Grid

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